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Can Dual Processing Theories of Thinking Inform Conceptual 
Learning in Mathematics? 
 
Ron Tzur1 
University of Colorado Denver 
 
Abstract: Concurring with Uri Leron’s (2010) cross-disciplinary approach to two 
distinct modes of mathematical thinking, intuitive and analytic, I discuss his elaboration 
and adaptation to mathematics education of the cognitive psychology dual-processing 
theory (DPT) in terms of (a) the problem significance and (b) features of the theory he 
adapts. Then, I discuss DPT in light of a constructivist stance on the inseparability 
between thinking and learning. In particular, I propose a brain-based account of 
conceptual learning—the Reflection on Activity-Effect Relationship (Ref*AER) 
framework—as a plausible alternative to DPT. I discuss advantages of the Ref*AER 
framework over DPT for mathematics education. 
Key Words: constructivism, reflection, anticipation, activity-effect, dual 
processing, heuristic-and-bias, intuitive, analytic, brain. 
 
 
This theoretical paper extends an article (Tzur, 2010b) in which I discussed Uri 
Leron’s (2010) plenary address during the last annual meeting of PME-NA. Being 
invited to discuss his paper re-acquainted me with the inspiring empirical and 
theoretical work that he and his colleagues were conducting in the last two 
decades (Leron & Hazzan, 2006, 2009). It also provided me with an important 
window into literature outside mathematics education (e.g., cognitive 
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psychology), which I consider as both thought provoking and relevant to our 
field. Last but not least, after reading his paper(s) I realized how naturally his 
approach linked with recent efforts in which I have been participating—to relate 
mathematics education research with cognitive neuroscience (brain studies). I 
concur with Leron’s belief that bridging between intuition and analytical 
thinking can contribute to optimizing student mathematical understandings and 
am delighted to provide my reflections on this endeavor. 
In itself, the main thesis that human thinking and judgment (or 
rationality) consist of two qualitatively distinct modes is not new to mathematics 
education. Skemp’s (1979) seminal work has already articulated and linked both 
modes, which he termed intuitive and reflective intelligences. To the best of my 
knowledge, Skemp’s constructivist theory evolved independently of the 
commencement of the ‘heuristic and bias’ approach (Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1983). 
Moreover, I believe that, in mathematics education, this distinction can be traced 
back to Dewey’s (1933) notion of reflective thought (contrasted with unconscious 
mental processes), and to Vygotsky’s (1986) notion of ZPD  and his related 
distinction between spontaneous and scientific concepts.  
However, two novelties in Leron’s contribution seemed very useful for 
mathematics education. First, his review of cognitive psychology literature 
pointed out to empirical studies in which a dual view of thinking processes has 
been robustly elaborated on (Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
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Stanovich, 2008) and ‘mapped’ onto corresponding, differentiated brain regions 
(Lieberman, 2003, 2008). Thus, a similarly important and timely direction, of 
linking mathematics education with brain studies (Medina, 2008), is supported 
by relevant findings from cognitive psychology (see Section 2). Second, he 
reported on studies (Leron & Hazzan, 2006, 2009) informed by DPT that 
demonstrated its applicability to our field, including articulation of instructional 
goals and design criteria. Next, I further discuss both contributions. 
1. SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS! USEFUL THEORY? 
1.1 Significance of DPT 
Like many teachers of mathematics and mathematics educators, Leron 
and his colleagues noticed a phenomenon that seemed to equally puzzle 
researchers in other fields. Quite often, researchers observing people’s solutions 
to various problems framed them as recurring faulty judgments (reasoning 
processes and conclusions). Examples of such solutions abound in the 
aforementioned papers; I will present three of my own below. Interestingly, 
studies of such examples in the ‘80s and ‘90s fueled a debate about human 
rationality that quite tightly conjoined epistemology and psychology (Goldman, 
1994; Kim, 1994; Nisbett & Ross, 1994; Quine, 1994). For example, alluding to 
computational complexity, Cherniak (1994) considered ‘ideal’  (normative) 
rationality as intractable. Instead, using the example of mathematicians working 
on unfeasibly long proofs he proposed ‘minimal’ rationality, owing much of its 
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functionality to ‘quick-and-dirty’ heuristics that evade practical (mental) 
paralysis.  
As I see it, addressing this puzzling phenomenon and significant problem 
by mathematics educators is more pressing and weighty than by cognitive 
psychologists and/or economists. As challenging as it might be to solidly explain 
why/how the human mind produces erroneous judgments, in those other fields 
it may suffice. The works of Leron (Leron, 2010; Leron & Hazzan, 2006, 2009) and 
others (Katz & Katz, 2010; Viholainen, 2008) indicate, however, that in our field 
such an explanation is but a start. In this sense, Leron made two key 
contributions: (a) clarifying a goal for student and teacher learning—closing the 
rather prevalent gap between intuitive and analytic reasoning, and (b) explicating 
mathematics educators’ duty to figure out ways of thinking about, designing, and 
implementing teaching that can foster student development of and disposition 
toward analytic reasoning. To these ends, Leron identified four vital questions 
for mathematics educators: 
i) What differentiates among those who solve problems correctly and 
incorrectly, that is, why do the latter fail to use analytic reasoning 
whereas the former do so? 
ii) Using the above as a basis—how can we explain observations about 
the ‘cueing impact’ of changes in a problem format or context have on 
correctly solving a problem, and what does this entail for instructional 
design? 
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iii) When using puzzling problem situations in our teaching (e.g., earth 
circumference), what strategies can be used to effectively capitalize on 
students’ “Aha” moments that follow those puzzlements? 
iv) How may we design instruction to promote (a) students’ (and 
teachers’) awareness of the potential use of improper intuitive reasoning 
and (b) disposition toward constant activation of analytic reasoning to 
override the faulty intuitions (i.e., resist and critique the intuitive)? 
1.2 Dual Processing Theory (DPT): Is It Useful for Mathematics Education? 
To articulate what purposes DPT can serve in mathematics education, I 
first briefly present its key features by alluding to one of Leron’s examples and 
three of mine (to keep it short, language does not precisely replicate the original 
problems).  
A. Adults with college education were asked: Two items cost $1.10; the 
difference in price is $1. How much does each item cost? (Over 50% 
submit to impulse and respond: $1 & $0.10) 
B. In the elevator, the 7th floor button is already lit. A person who also 
wanted that floor gets on the elevator and, though seeing the lit button, 
pressed it again. 
C. Grade 3 students were asked to reason which side will a next (fair) coin 
flip show, ‘Head or Tail’, after it showed 4 ‘Heads’ in a row. Roughly 
50% said ‘Head’, because it’s always been the case; the rest said ‘Tail’, 
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because it could not always be ‘Head’. Virtually no one reasoned 50-50, 
and that previous flips were irrelevant. 
D. As a Sudoku enthusiast, I made two careless errors while solving a 
‘black-belt’ puzzle (see Figure 1). In the puzzle on the left (1a), I 
considered and almost wrote ‘4’ in the bottom-middle square while 
transposing the digits to a different cell and ignoring the vertical 
‘conflict’. Two minutes later, while solving the puzzle on the right (1b), 
I actually committed a similar error (considering only vertical ‘9’ and 
writing the small ‘9’ digits where the top one conflicts with a 
horizontal, given ‘9’). 
 
Figure 1a. Processing error not committed; 
almost placing ‘4’ in mid-lower left cell 
(transpose row, ignore vertical) 
 
Figure 1b. Same error repeated & 
committed; ‘9’ in left-lower cell 
(checked for vertical only)  
The key insight about human thinking, which led to different variants of 
DPT, is that responses to vastly diverse problems, faulty or correct, may all share 
                                                                                                      TME, vol8, no.3, p .603 
 
a common root. As implied by its name, the basic tenet of DPT is that two 
different modes of brain processing are at work (Evans, 2003, 2006; Stanovich, 
2008; Stanovich & West, 2000). The first mode, ‘intuitive reasoning’ (or 
‘heuristic’), is considered evolutionary more ancient and shared with animals. It 
is characterized by automatic (reflexive, sub-conscious), rapid, and parallel in 
nature processing, with only its final product available to consciousness. The 
second mode, ‘analytic reasoning’, is evolutionary recent and considered unique 
to humans. It is intentional (reflective, conscious), relatively slow, and sequential 
in nature. The principal roles attributed by DPT to the second mode are 
monitoring, critiquing, and correcting judgments produced by the first mode. 
Said differently, the second mode of processing suppresses/inhibits default 
responses; it serves as a failure-prevention-and-correction mental device. As 
Leron (2010) pointed out, some cognitive psychologists refer to the intuitive 
mode as System-1 (S1) and to the analytic mode as System-2 (S2). They further 
emphasize that, quite often, both systems work in tandem, which basically 
means that S1 produced a proper judgment that S2 did not need to correct. 
A second tenet of DPT is that, in essence, faulty responses given by 
problem solvers reflect failure of their analytic processes to prevent-and-correct 
output from their intuitive processes. A key, corresponding assumption that 
seems to be taken-as-shared by most proponents of DPT and to underlie the 
notion of ‘rational judgment/actions’, is that at any given problem situation a 
person intends to accomplish a correct solution that serves her or his own 
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purposes (e.g., economic benefit, academic success, etc.). In the four examples 
above, a person would like to properly solve the problems but, as DPT explains, 
the fast-reacting insuppressible S1 tends to “hijack” the subject’s attention and 
thus yields a non-normative answer (Leron, 2010). Thus, in Example A, S1 ‘falls 
prey’ to the cost of one item ($1) being equal to the difference. In Example B, S1 
brings forth and directs execution of the planned action (get on elevator, identify-
and-press 7th floor button) before S2 could re-evaluate necessity in the 
circumstances. In Example D (Figure 1b), S1 directed my actions to place the 
digits with only partial checking before S2 detected that partiality. This occurred 
soon after I actually thought of placing the ‘4’ where it is shown in Figure 1a, but 
then consciously (S2 override) avoided this error. Example C (predicting results 
of a coin flip) was selected to highlight a few hurdles with DPT, particularly the 
impact of problem solvers’ cognitive abilities on their solutions (Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Clearly, what to an observer would appear as non-normative 
responses (e.g., it’s most likely to be ‘Head’) was the proper response within the 
children’s cognitive system—a case of S1 and S2 working in tandem for the 
reasoner, though erroneously for an observer. 
Before turning to hindrances I find in DPT, a few more comments seem 
noteworthy. Evans (2006) highlighted a key distinction to keep in mind—
between dual processes and dual systems. This is important for mathematics 
education particularly because, as he asserted, dual system theories are too 
broad. Thus, he asserted the need to elaborate specific dual-reasoning accounts at 
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an intermediate level that explains solutions to particular tasks. To me, his goal 
(particular task) seems primary whereas the means (dual accounts, or singular, 
or triple) seems secondary.  
This leads to my second comment—the need to pay particular attention to 
solution processes—and kinds of problem situations—in which 
analytic/reflective processes successfully monitor and correct S1’s ‘run’ before 
reaching and submitting to the latter’s judgment. For example, when I first read 
Example A in Leron’s paper, I immediately identified the task as ‘inviting’ the 
faulty conclusion. I also immediately noticed my conscious, pro-active ‘flagging’ 
of this tendency and, consequently, selected an analytic process instead. This 
mental adjustment happened before I even calculated the faulty difference (90 
cents), precisely the desired state of affairs indicated in question #iv above. My 
case indicates the need for precisely analyzing the way intuitive and analytic 
processes interact. Initial forms of DPT assumed sequential operation, where 
outcomes of intuitive processes (or S1) serve as input for analytic processes only 
when/if S2 identified S1’s output as a faulty response. Recently, the possibility 
for parallel processing of both modes was postulated, including the idea that 
they often compete for the immediate or final judgment in a given problem 
situation (Evans, 2006). To further theorize such interaction, Evans suggested 3 
principles: (a) singularity—epistemic mental models are generated and judged 
one-at-a-time, (b) relevance—intuitive (heuristic) processes contextualize 
problems to maximize relevance to the person’s current goals, and (c) 
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satisficing—analytic processes tend to accept intuitive judgments unless there is a 
good reason to reject and override them. While essential, it seems that these 
principles fall short of accounting for how I solved Example A.  
My last comment refers to factors that were found to make a difference in 
ways groups of people, or even an individual, solve particular problems. 
Stanovich and colleagues (2008; Stanovich & West, 2000) provided a good review 
of those. Here, I refer to a critical factor for mathematics education that was 
highlighted in Leron’s (2010) address, namely, the impact of problem format 
(‘packaging’) on suppression of intuitive judgments. A substantial portion of 
Leron’s work, which I see as a major contribution to our field, focused on the 
design of bridging tasks that are more likely to trigger what he considered 
solvers’ available analytic processes. These tasks, in turn, enabled student 
solutions of the mathematically congruent tasks that were difficult to unpack 
without such bridging. This indirect allusion to assimilatory conceptions of those 
for whom bridging is required points to a hindrance. 
From a constructivist perspective, a major theoretical and practical 
hindrance I find in DPT is the unproblematic application of an observer’s frame 
of reference—considered as ‘normative’—to the evaluation of people’s 
responses—considered as ‘rational’ (or not, or partial). In essence, if the ‘same’ 
task is solved differently by people of different cognitive abilities (the observing 
researchers included), and if many who failed on a structurally identical task can 
solve a bridging task (and later also the failed one), then what a problem solver 
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brings to the task must be explicitly distinguished from the observer’s cognitive 
toolbox. Simply put, the presence of two cognitive frames of reference is glossed 
over by DPT’s equating of normative with rational (for more about this, see 
Nisbett & Ross, 1994).  
Theoretically, and crucial for mathematics education, what this lack of 
distinction fails to acknowledge is both the different interpretation(s) of a task 
and different mental activities available to the observed person for solving it. 
That is, it fails to acknowledge the core construct of assimilation (Piaget, 1980, 
1985; von Glasersfeld, 1995). Recent research in cognitive psychology did point 
out to possible differences between observer and observed interpretations 
(Stanovich & West, 2000), but the key theoretical implication of those findings—
simultaneously addressing two frames of reference—did not seem to follow. In 
my view, distinguishing the observer (Roth & Bautista, 2011; Steffe, 1995; von 
Glasersfeld, 1991) and using assimilation as a starting point is necessary in our 
field in order to move beyond cognitive psychology’s focus on thinking and 
reasoning into accounts of learning as a conceptual advance that can be 
observed, and fostered, in other people’s minds. And, as Skemp (1979) so 
eloquently asserted, for a mathematics education theory of teaching to be 
useful—at its core one must articulate learning as a process of cognitive change 
in what the learner already knows.  
Practically, overlooking learners’ available conceptions when analyzing 
their solutions, correct or faulty, precludes the powerful design of bridging tasks 
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demonstrated in Leron’s (2010) paper. Indirectly, both the specific features of 
those tasks (e.g., the need to cue for a nested sub-set, or steps to ‘see’ the 
invariant length of string-around-earth when different shapes increase) and the 
rationale and criteria he provided for introducing those features (e.g., make the 
problem accessible to the solver’s intuition), draw on conjectured inferences about 
how a person may interpret and solve the alternative tasks. That is, such tasks 
require inferences into students’ existing (assimilatory) conceptions. This leads to 
the discussion of DPT’s core hindrance.  
2. A CONSTRUCTIVIST LENS ON DPT: ‘BRAINY’ MATHEMATICS 
EDUCATION 
2.1 Taking Issue with DPT 
As a constructivist, I adhere to the core premise common to Piaget’s (1970, 
1971, 1985), Dewey’s (Dewey, 1902; 1949), and Vygotsky’s (1978, 1986) grand 
theories, that knowing (thinking, reasoning) cannot be understood apart from the 
‘historical process’ in which one’s knowing evolved. This premise entails my 
twofold thesis about hurdles in adopting and adapting DPT to mathematics 
education. First, a sole focus on normative and faulty modes of 
thinking/reasoning in mathematics or other domains (aka cognitive psychology), 
falls short of the theoretical accounts needed to intentionally foster optimal 
student (and teacher) understandings. Second, although DPT can inform our 
work, mathematics education already has frameworks that interweave 
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articulated accounts of knowing, coming to know (learning), and teaching 
(Dreyfus, 2002; Dubinsky & Lewin, 1986; Hershkowitz, Schwarz, & Dreyfus, 
2001; Pirie & Kieren, 1992, 1994; Sfard, 1991, 2000; Steffe, 1990, 2010; Tall & 
Vinner, 1981; Thompson, 2002, 2010; Thompson, Carlson, & Silverman, 2007). As 
I shall discuss below, one framework that my colleagues and I have been 
developing—reflection on activity-effect relationship (Ref*AER)—seems to (a) 
singularly resolve issues of faulty/normative reasoning and of conceptual learning 
(with or without teaching) and (b) explain different modes of thinking without 
alluding to 2 systems (or distinct processes). Moreover, the Ref*AER framework 
is supported by and gives support to cognitive neuroscience models of the brain. 
Due to space limitations, the brief exposition below makes wide use of references 
to comprehensive versions. I begin by listing seven critical questions for 
mathematics education that Leron’s work and accounts of DPT raised, and a 
framework such as Ref*AER needs to address:  
1. Why does the mental system of some people make an error (e.g., selects 
$1 and 10 cents in the price example A) whereas other people focus also 
on the difference? Unless one considers solvers’ assimilatory 
conceptions, this question (and 2-4 below) cannot be resolved by DPT 
assumptions that S2 has no direct access to the perceived information or 
that S2 selects accessible instead of relevant information. 
2. When a person’s response is non-normative, is it a case of (a) having the 
required conceptions but failing to trigger them (e.g., Sudoku and 
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elevator examples), (b) having a rudimentary form of those conceptions 
that require explicit prompting (e.g., sub-set in Leron’s (2010) bridging 
task; renegotiating the difference aspect in the price problem and/or 
making the numbers more ‘difficult’), or (c) not having a conception for 
monitoring S1 (e.g., my next coin-flip example and the original medical 
base-rate example in Leron’s paper)? And how can we distinguish 
among these three cases? 
3. How does S2, which failed to monitor S1 in a specific task, become 
capable of doing so? Is the process of learning different for each of the 
three cases above? 
4. How do new monitoring capacities learned by S2 ‘migrate’ to S1 
(become automatic)? 
5. What is the source of learners’ surprise (e.g., string-around-earth 
example), how may it be linked to learning, and how might teaching 
capitalize on this? 
6. What role do specific examples play in learning (by S2 and/or S1)? 
7. Can we explain why particular bridging tasks promote some learning 
in some students but not others, and provide explicit ideas for changing 
them in the latter case? 
2.2 A Brain-Based Model of Knowing and Learning 
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In recent years, a few cross-disciplinary meetings among cognitive 
neuroscientists and mathematics educators took place. One of those (Vanderbilt, 
2006) focused on the design of tasks that (a) reveal difficult milestones in 
mathematics and (b) can be examined at the brain level (e.g., fMRI). Using the 
Ref*AER framework of knowing and learning (Simon & Tzur, 2004; Simon, Tzur, 
Heinz, & Kinzel, 2004; Tzur, 2007; Tzur & Simon, 2004; Tzur, Xin, Si, Woodward, 
& Jin, 2009), I presented fractional tasks to the group. This presentation, and the 
fertile dialogue with brain researchers that ensued, led to an elaborated, brain-
based Ref*AER account (Tzur, accepted for publication) that seems highly 
consistent with DPT studies of the brain (Lieberman, 2003, 2008).  
Briefly, Ref*AER depicts knowing (having a conception) as anticipating and 
justifying an invariant relationship between a single (goal-directed) activity-
sequence the mental system executes at any given moment (Evans’ Singularity 
principle; see also Medina, 2008), potentially or actually, and the effect it must 
bring forth. Learning is explained as transformation in such anticipation via two 
basic types of reflection. Reflection Type-I consists of ongoing, automatic 
comparison the mental system executes continually between the goal it sets for the 
activity-sequence and subsequent effects produced and noticed. As Piaget (1985) 
asserted, the internal global goal (anticipated effect) serves as a regulator of the 
execution for both interim effects and the final one (Evans’ Relevance principle) 
(see also Stich, 1994). The effects either match the anticipation or not (Evans’ 
Satisficing principle). By default, the mental system runs an activity-sequence to 
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its completion as determined by the goal (e.g., the elevator example). Yet, the 
execution may stop earlier if (a) the goal detects unanticipated sub-effects (e.g., 
Sudoku example in Figure 1a) or (b) a different goal became the regulator, 
including possibly a sub-goal within the activity-sequence overriding the global 
goal. Reflection Type-II consists of comparison across (mental) records of experiences, 
each containing a linked, re-presented bit of a ‘run’ of the activity and its effect 
(AER), sorted as match or no-match. Critically, Type-II reflection does not 
happen automatically—the brain may or may not execute it. The recurring, 
invariant AER across those experiences are linked with the situation(s) in which 
they were found anticipatory of the proper goal and registered as a new 
conception.  
Accordingly, Ref*AER postulates that the construction of a new conception 
proceeds through two stages. The first, participatory, necessitates reflection Type-I 
and is marked by an anticipation that a problem solver can access only when and if 
somehow prompted for the novel, provisional AER (Tzur & Lambert, in press, 
linked this stage with the Zone of Proximal Development—ZPD). The second, 
anticipatory stage necessitates reflection Type-II and is marked by independent, 
spontaneous bringing forth, running, and possibly justifying the novel 
anticipation. It should be noted that although developed independently, Ref*AER 
is consistent with Skemp’s (1979) theory; the reflection types and stage 
distinctions extend his work. 
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To link the Ref*AER framework with brain studies, I separated and 
‘distributed’ von Glasersfeld’s (1995) tripartite notion of scheme—situation, 
activity, and result—across three major neuronal systems in which they are 
postulated to be processed. The assumption regarding both knowing and 
learning is that the fundamental unit of analysis in the brain is not a single 
synaptic connection or a neuron (Hebb, 1949, cited in Baars & Gage, 2007; Crick 
& Koch, 2003; Fuster, 1997, 2003). To stress neuronal ‘firing’ in the brain and the 
life-long growth, change, and decay of neuronal networks (Medina, 2008), I use 
the term Synapse Inhibition/Excitation Constellation (SIEC)—any-size aggregate 
of synapses of connected neurons that, once ‘firing’ and updating, forms a stable 
pattern of activity (Baars, 2007b). The roles and functions of SIECs are described 
in terms of the three neuronal networks where they may be activated (Baars, 
2007a): a ‘Recognition System’ (RecSys), which includes the sensory input/buffer 
and various long-term memories; a ‘Strategic System’ (StrSys), which includes 
the Central Executive; and an ‘Engagement-Emotive System’ (EngSys). Within 
these networks, solving a problem, as well as learning through problem solving, 
is postulated as follows (indices in the diagram correspond to those in the text 
below): 
1. Solving a problem begins with assimilating it via one’s sensory 
modalities into the Situation part of an extant scheme in the RecSys. 
This SIEC is firing and updating until reaching its activity pattern 
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(recognizing state), and activates firing and updating of a Goal SIEC in 
the StrSys. 
2. A Goal SIEC is set in the StrSys as a desired inhibition-excitation state 
that regulates the execution and termination of an activity sequence. The 
goal SIEC also triggers: 
a. Corresponding SIECs in the EngSys that set the desirability of the 
experience and the sense of control the learner has over the activity 
(McGaugh, 2002; Medina, 2008; Tzur, 1996; Zull, 2002). These were 
found linked to activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (Bush, Luu, 
& Posner, 2000; Lieberman, 2003, 2008). 
b. A temporary auxiliary SIEC checks if an activity has already been 
partly executed and can thus be resumed. If its output is ‘Yes’, it re-
triggers the AER’s execution in the StrSys from the stopping point 
(go to #4); if ‘No,’ it triggers the Goal SIEC to trigger #3 below. 
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Figure 2. Brain problem solving and learning processes 
3. A SIEC responsible for searching-and-selecting an available AER is 
triggered by the Goal SIEC. The search operates on three different 
long-term memory ‘storages’ of SIECs (3a, 3b, 3c below). Using a 
metaphor of ‘road-map’, Skemp (1979) explained that, within every 
universe of discourse (e.g., math, economy), the ‘path’ from a present 
state to a goal state may consist of multiple activity-sequences, among 
which one that is eventually executed is selected (see also multiple-
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trace theory in Nadel, Samsonovich, Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2000). 
Searched and selected AERs include: 
a. Anticipatory AERs – a mental operation carried out and its 
anticipated effect; 
b. Participatory AERs that the learner is currently forming and can 
thus be called up only if prompted, as indicated by the dotted 
arrow; 
c. Mental (e.g., mathematical) ‘objects,’ which are essentially 
anticipatory AERs established and encapsulated previously (e.g., 
‘number’ is the anticipated effect of a counting operation). 
4. Once an operation and an ‘object’ AERs were selected, the brain 
executes them while monitoring progress to the goal via a meta-
cognitive SIEC in the StrSys responsible for Type-I reflections. Skemp’s 
(1979, see ch. 11) model articulates this component in great details, 
including how it can be carried out automatically (intuitive) and/or 
reflectively (analytic). This goal-based monitoring component seems 
compatible with Norman and Shallice’s (2000) model of schema 
activation, Corbetta and Sulman’s (2002) notion of ‘circuit breaker’, 
and Kalbfleisch, Van Meter, and Zeffiro’s (2006) identification of brain 
internal evaluation of response correctness. Mathematical operations 
are mainly activated in the Intraparietal Sulcus (IPS, see Nieder, 2005). 
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5. The execution of the selected AER is constantly monitored by Type-I 
reflection to determine 3 features: 
a. Was the learner’s goal, as set in SIEC 2a, met? 
b. Is the AER execution moving toward or away from the goal (see 
McGovern, 2007 for relevant emotions)?  
c. Is the final effect of the executed portion of the AER different from 
the anticipated, set goal? Goldberg and Bougakov (2007) suggested 
that this is a function of prefrontal cortex (PFC). 
Each feature (5a, 5b, 5c) can stop the currently executed AER (e.g., 
seeing the lit elevator button halts the process leading to pressing it 
again). If the output of 5c is ‘No’, that ‘run’ of the AER is registered as 
another record of experience of the existing scheme (see Zull, 2002). 
Symbolically, such no-novelty can be written: Situation0-Goal0-AER0 
(Tzur & Simon, 2004). If the output is ‘Yes’, symbolized as Situation0-
Goal0-AER1, a new conceptualization may commence (see next). This 
perturbing state of the mental system (von Glasersfeld, 1995), seems 
related to anticorrelations of brain networks (Fox, et al., 2005). 
6. Type-II reflective comparisons may then operate on the output records 
of Type-I reflection. Whenever the output of Type-I question 5c is 
‘Yes,’ the brain updates a new SIEC for that recently run AER and stores 
it in a temporary auxiliary in the RecSys (symbolized A0-E1, or AER1). 
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Each repetition of the solution process for which the output of 5c is 
‘Yes’ adds another such record to the temporary auxiliary. 
7. The accruing records of temporary AER1 (novel) compounds are 
continually monitored by Type-II reflective comparison SIEC in terms 
of two features: 
a. Is the effect of the new AER (E1) closer to or further away from the 
Goal? 
b. How is the new AER1 similar to or different from the extant 
anticipatory and/or participatory AERs in the RecSys? This aspect 
of Type-II reflection seems supported by Moscovitch et al.’s (2007) 
articulation of the constant interchanges between MTL and PFC. 
The output of recurring Type-II reflective comparisons is a new SIEC 
(AER1). The anticipatory-participatory stage distinction implies that a new SIEC 
can initially be accessed by the Search-an-Select SIEC (#3) only if the learner is 
prompted for the activity (A0), which generates the noticed effect (E1) and thus 
‘opens’ the neuronal path to using AER1 in response to the triggering situation 
(Situation0). Over time, Type-II comparisons of the repeated use of AER1 for 
Situation0 produces a new neuronal pathway from the Situation0 SIEC to the 
newly formed AER1, that is, to the construction of a new, directly retrievable, 
anticipatory SIEC (scheme symbolized as Situation1-Goal1-AER1). This 
construction of an anticipatory AER seems to explain how repeatedly correct 
analytic judgments may become intuitive (automatic). 
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3. DISCUSSION: BRAIN-BASED REF*AER VS. DPT 
I contend that Ref*AER, with its brain-based elaboration, simultaneously 
resolves not only the reasoning puzzlement addressed by DPT, but also central 
problems of mathematics learning and teaching. Concerning what an observer 
considers normative solutions, Ref*AER explains and predicts their production as 
the outcome of either an anticipatory conception, which can run automatically 
and/or reflectively, or a compatible participatory conception that was made 
accessible by a prompt—self/internal (e.g., Soduku-1a) or external (e.g., Leron’s 
bridging task, apple falling on Newton’s head). Accordingly, faulty solutions may 
be the outcome of (a) partial, inefficient, and/or flawed execution of a suitable 
anticipatory conception (e.g., Soduku-1, elevator), (b) prompt-dependent 
inability to access a suitable participatory conception (e.g., solving the $1.10 
incorrectly when difference=$1 and correctly with other amounts), and, quite 
often, (c) lack of a suitable conception for correctly solving the given problem 
(e.g., 3rd graders facing the next coin-flip problem, Leron’s students who could 
not solve the bridging task).  
I further contend that, for mathematics education purposes, and possibly 
also cognitive psychology, Ref*AER resolves DPT problems better. Instead of 
postulating two systems (or processes), it explains how the brain gives rise to a 
multi-part single thought process by which a problem solver may reach a 
normative or a faulty answer. Furthermore, it stresses that a ‘solution’ must 
encompass not only the answer, but also the crucial (inferred) solver’s reasoning 
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processes used for producing it. A good demonstration of such analysis, and the 
vitality of intuitive solutions (e.g., for finding limits of sequences), were provided 
by Hersh (2011). Ref*AER accomplishes such inferences via analyzing the 
solver’s: (i) goal and sub-goals (see Stanovich & West, 2000, for differing 
researcher/subject goals), (ii) entire or partial activity-sequence selected and 
executed (see Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, for the notion of Attribute 
Substitution), (iii) suitability of objects operated on (see Leron’s, 2010, specific 
explication of objects, such as length gap in the string-around-earth task and the 
nested sub-set in his RMP task), (iv) sub- and final effects noticed, and (v) 
successful/failed reflections (both types).  
Most importantly, Ref*AER analyses are rooted in an explicit distinction 
between two frames of reference operating in the evaluation of solvers’ 
judgments—the observer’s advanced, well-justified frame and the observed’s 
evolving and sensible frame in terms of his or her extant conceptions (Roth & 
Bautista, 2011; Steffe, 1995). Thus, consistent with Stich’s (1994) assertion that 
cognitive systems serve one’s goals and not absolute truths, Ref*AER evades the 
pitfalls of equating normative with rational. Instead, it clarifies that upon a 
solver’s assimilation of a problem situation and setting her/his goal(s), one path 
among multiple extant activity-sequences (spontaneously known or prompted) is 
selected, executed and being monitored by the goal. By default, the brain runs 
the sequence to its completion, which is signaled via Type-I comparison (goal 
SIEC), and can thus be portrayed by an observer as intuitive/automatic. 
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However, at any given moment during the activity-sequence execution or after 
its completion, the system’s regulator (goal SIEC) may notice effects that require 
interruption and/or correction to the run and/or even to the goal itself 
(portrayed as analytic/reflective). In paraphrasing Gigerenzer’s (2005) “I think, 
therefore I err”, we shall say: “I learn to think, therefore I may adjust (initially) 
erroneous anticipations.” 
Consequently, Ref*AER seems to provide a basis for resolving two 
problems that, while not addressed by DPT, are vital for mathematics education, 
namely, explaining (a) how learning to reason—both intuitively and 
analytically—may occur and (b) how can teaching capitalize on it and foster 
(optimize) students’ mathematical progress. The former has been articulated 
above in a way that seems to address each of the 7 questions presented in Section 
2. The latter (implications for teaching) exceeds the scope of this paper; it was 
articulated elsewhere (Tzur, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a) as a 7-step cycle that proceeds 
from analysis of students’ extant conceptions. To briefly convey the potential of 
this Ref*AER-based 7-step cycle, I return to Leron’s example of a bridging (RMP) 
task.  
In designing that task, Leron made explicit the two-phase activity-
sequence of considering base-rate (1/1000) and diagnostic information (5% false 
positive) as necessarily linked sub-goals. What’s more, the ‘objects’ on which his 
alternative sequence would operate were replaced, from multiplicatively related 
quantities (fractions, percents) to frequencies of whole numbers considered 
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additively up to the final multiplicative calculation. In terms of Ref*AER, these 
alterations explain why some of the students who incorrectly solved the DMP 
problem could correctly solve the RMP problem. The alteration was more likely 
to orient solvers to (a) explicitly coordinated sub-goals (specifying each of the 
nested sub-sets) of the task’s global goal and (b) selection of and operation on 
accessible quantities—anticipatory AER (‘objects’)—in place of quantities that are 
notoriously prompt-dependent (or lacking) in youngsters and adults and thus, 
not surprisingly, ‘neglected’. Accordingly, these insightfully designed task 
alterations explain the educative power of a bridging task. It seemed to bring 
forth an anticipatory AER that, I conjecture, could have served Leron’s students 
as an internal prompt for correctly selecting-and-executing the entire activity-
sequence for operating similarly on the more difficult-to-grasp multiplicative 
quantities and relationships.  
Leron’s design of bridging task not only fits well within the Ref*AER-
based, 7-step teaching cycle, but also with a teaching practice we recently found 
in China (Gu, Huang, & Marton, 2006; Jin & Tzur, 2011). Our study was based on 
Xianyan Jin’s dissertation, which provided a penetrating inspection of how 
bridging (‘xianjie’) tasks are consistently fitted within a 4-component lesson 
structure in Chinese mathematics teaching. She further ‘mapped’ the 7-step cycle 
onto the Chinese lesson structure, while highlighting the role that bridging tasks, 
like those designed by Leron et al. (Leron, 2010; Leron & Hazzan, 2009), can play 
in the cycle’s critical first step—activating students’ extant (assimilatory) 
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conceptions. Alluding to Leron’s (2010) closing slogan, I believe that, without 
positing thinking dualities, mathematics teaching informed by the brain-based 
Ref*AER framework, and designed to bridge between available (assimilatory) 
and intended mathematical ideas, can nurture the power of natural (intuitive) 
thinking, address the challenge of stretching it, and inform the beauty of 
overcoming it (via anticipatory analytic processes). 
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